

Whatever the cause, the resulting picture lingered in his mind, so that he referred to it again in the same play. As Orestes describes to the Chorus how Clytemnestra pleaded with him not to kill her (1212 sq.), he refers to her hanging from his cheeks, *παρήδων τ' ἐξ ἐμῶν | ἐκρήμναθ'*, a very difficult thing to do, if you are engaged with someone who is trying to kill you with a sword. Touching the cheek was the normal gesture of a suppliant, of course, and here *γένυν* is the word used. *κρήναιμαι*, however, has the sense of hanging over, beetling, suspended from an edge, and we must therefore try to imagine Clytemnestra clinging to Orestes—not indeed with her feet off the ground—but forcefully, as he recoils, so that, by keeping as close as she can, she may prevent him from wielding his sword, a manoeuvre successful, if only for a moment (*ὥστε χέρας ἐμὰς λυπεῖν βέλος*). Her suppliant's gesture, then, is turned into a grasp just below or behind the jaw-bone; in other words, Clytemnestra has her son by the throat, however briefly, and the word Euripides employs for this is *παρήδων*—a queer transference of idea from sacrificer and victim in the first passage to victim and avenger in the second. I am prepared to suggest, therefore, that there is no need to postulate *παιδὸς* or *πατὴρ δέριν* to fill in a possible blank or illegible line, since *παρήδα*, although difficult, may be shown to work perfectly well.

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AN ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THUCYDIDES

4. 4. 1

IN a recent article¹ M. H. B. Marshall discussed the problematic sentence which makes up Thucydides 4. 4. 1 and proposed the following text:

ὥς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε [. . .] ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις κοινώσας ἡσύχαξε, ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας [. . .] αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁρμὴ ἐνέπεσε περιστάσιν ἐκτείχισαι τὸ χωρίον.

This would be admirably clear and would give excellent sense, but it does entail the deletion of *μέχρι* as an interpolation before *αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις*.² Marshall is aware that *μέχρι* is a word that is not likely to be used by an interpolator, but still feels able to propose its deletion and gives a detailed account of the way in which an interpolator might have approached the sentence. When one attempts to read the mind of an ancient scribe, all sorts of possibilities are opened up; in this instance, it seems equally possible that a reader who, as Marshall suggests, was faced with . . . *ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις κ.τ.λ.* and was not able to understand the sentence because he failed to separate *ἡσύχαζεν* from *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας* and to see that *ἡσύχαζεν* was to be taken in the second *οὔτε* clause, would have been inclined first at least to see whether sense could be obtained by separating *ἡσύχαζεν* from *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας* rather than to conjure up the word *μέχρι*. There are two further objections to Marshall's proposal, first that in itself the *μέχρι . . . χωρίον* clause is a perfectly clear and

¹ C.R. n.s. xxi (1971), 320–3.

² And the deletion of *τοὺς στρατιώτας* as an interpolation before *ὕστερον* and the acceptance of *ἐνέπεσε* in preference to the manu-

scripts, reading *ἐσέπεσε*. Both of these proposals seem to me entirely sensible. See my remarks on these readings, *Hermes* xcv (1967), 378.

satisfactory unit and there seems no good reason to alter it. The difficulty is not this clause, but rather the words *ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας*. Secondly, objection can be made to Marshall's contention that the two expressions *ἡσύχαζεν* and *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας*, which on his own admission are words which represent 'very readily associated ideas', are to be separated and treated as parts of different clauses. I do not myself believe that Thucydides was so obtuse as to give his readers such a natural combination in the expectation that they would see it was not a combination at all. *ἡσύχαζεν* and *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας* do go together, and any interpretation of the sentence as a whole must depend on their interpretation.

My own position remains the same as it was when I discussed this sentence a few years ago.¹ It is possible to retain a text:

ὥς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε [τοὺς στρατιώτας,] ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξίρχοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁρμὴ ἐσέπεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον

without imparting to *ἡσύχαζεν* or *ὑπὸ* meanings which they do not naturally have. For a proper understanding of the meaning of these words here, one has to consider their context, beginning at 3. 1, and not merely the single sentence in which they occur. One of the things that emerge from the passage is that Demosthenes was very determined to have his way, and Eurymedon and Sophocles were similarly determined that he should not.² Thucydides gives clear indications of the nature of the debate by means of words which point to the view of one side and then the other, alternately, namely *ἐκέλευε . . . ἀντιλεγόντων . . . ἡξίου* with *ἀπέφαινε . . . ἔφρασαν . . . ἐδόκει*. I would suggest that the reader, knowing that Demosthenes is not in command of the expedition (having been told this in the previous chapter), and, more important, having just read about persistent argument from Demosthenes, has no difficulty when he reaches the sentence beginning *ὥς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν κ.τ.λ.* in interpreting *ἡσύχαζεν* as 'he kept quiet' or 'he made no further moves (to have Pylos fortified)'.³ But then, of course, the reader comes up against the phrase *ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας*. This, or something like this, I would venture to suggest he is half-expecting in so far as he would be surprised, in view of what he has read of the persistence of Demosthenes so far, to find that it was merely his failure to persuade the others that induced him to give up the attempt to have the place fortified. What Thucydides is trying to tell us in the phrase *ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας* is that it was not so much the arguments of the others as the fact that the fleet could not sail⁴ that deterred him from making any further moves. Thucydides

¹ Loc. cit. 378-9.

² I agree with Marshall that 4. 3. 3 suggests animated discussion.

³ Nowhere in Thucydides does the verb *ἡσύχαζεν* mean 'to keep silent'. See M. H. N. von Essen, *Index Thucydideus* (1887); cf. E.-A. Bétant, *Lexicon Thucydideum* (reprinted 1961). In view of this, the rendering of *ἡσύχαζεν* in 4. 4. 1 as 'he kept quiet' in the sense 'he made no further moves' is preferable to both Gomme's 'stopped importuning' (n. ad loc.) and Marshall's '(could not) hold his peace', as being nearer to the basic meaning of the verb as used by Thucydides,

namely 'to be inactive'. Moreover, 'he made no further moves' goes rather better with the *μέχρι κ.τ.λ.* clause than 'he stopped importuning'. What part Demosthenes played in the building once it commenced, and whether he approached Eurymedon and Sophocles again, are not made clear, but presumably he did become openly (on this, see my earlier note, 379) active again and did not simply start to importune the generals once more.

⁴ *ἄπλοια* strictly means 'impossibility of sailing', and not the 'bad weather' that makes it impossible to sail. Cf. ii. 85. 6; vi. 22; viii. 99 (instances listed by von Essen).

does not say directly why he gave way. We are left to deduce that it was because he was hopeful that the inactivity caused by the bad weather might ultimately be to his advantage. It seems reasonable also to assume that when in fact the troops did become bored, Demosthenes surreptitiously suggested to them that they might usefully spend their time fortifying the place. Marshall maintains that in some way the idea came to the soldiers as a result of rumours which emanated from the animated discussions between Demosthenes and the others. This is possible, and certainly it is difficult to believe that the soldiers, without first having heard of the idea, would themselves have decided to fortify Pylos, but it is more likely, in view of Demosthenes' determination, especially if he did deliberately allow the weather time to play its part, that he had a hand in the business throughout.

Marshall believes that on my proposal the sentence *ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν . . . χωρίον* constitutes a highly condensed version of a Herodotean-type anecdote. There seems to me to be nothing Herodotean or anecdotal about the sentence. It is simply a condensed version of what happened, and is probably to be accounted for not by carelessness on Thucydides' part but partly, as I argued in my earlier note, by the fact that Thucydides is concerned only with the main facts about the building of the fort, as can be seen from his omission of other pieces of information that might be considered important, and partly by his desire to show 'the contribution of fortune, and not the contribution of Demosthenes, to the development of a situation which had unexpectedly far-reaching consequences'.¹ Moreover, if, as Marshall holds, it was Thucydides' intention in this 'anecdote' to throw credit on Demosthenes,² he would have tried to avoid saying anything directly which might have indicated in-subordination on Demosthenes' part.

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PROPERTIUS 3. 7

AFTER line 16 I read:

Paete, quid aetatem numeras? quid cara natanti	
mater in ore tibi est? non habet unda deos.	18
sed tua nunc volucres astant super ossa marinae,	11
nunc tibi pro tumulo Carpathium omne mare est.	12
reddat corpus humo, posita est in gurgite vita;	25
Paetum sponte tua, vilis harena, tegas;	
et quotiens Paeti transibit nauta sepulcrum,	
dicat 'Et audaci tu timor esse potes.'	

ὑπὸ here bears its usual meaning in such combinations with abstracts, indicating a yielding under the pressure or influence of something.

¹ H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (1968), 108.

² I do not, in any case, believe this. See Westlake, *ibid.* Also I am not convinced by Marshall that the soldiers were willing to do Demosthenes' will unbidden. There is no evidence that these troops had any special

loyalty to him. What is more, he had been out of office since his return from Acarnania (4. 2. 4) and although his victory in Amphilochoia had clearly done something to erase from Athenian minds the memory of his defeat in Aetolia (3. 114. 1), so much so that he was given permission to use around the Peloponnese the ships that were destined for Sicily, one does not have the impression that he was enjoying any undue popularity.